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Europe, human rights and land law in the 21st
century: An English example
Susan Pascoe*
The central theme of this article is an examination of the influences of Europe
and human rights law on English land law. The Supreme Court decisions in
Manchester City Council v Pinnock and Hounslow LBC v Powell are pivotal in
aligning English land law with human rights principles in relation to public
authority landowners under the European Convention on Human Rights. This
article analyses six developments in the law: first, the gradual diminution of
the “wide margin of appreciation” of national authorities; second, the
modification of the stance towards human rights in repossession cases; third,
difficulties pertaining to proportionality; fourth, the continuing significance of
the Wednesbury test of unreasonableness; fifth, the impact of human rights
on proprietary certainty in English land law; and last, whether possession
proceedings will become based on fair outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
This article analyses how land law in England is being modified by European influences and a human
rights agenda in the context of public authority landowners seeking repossession. Although the
analysis is within the context of public authority landowners, the influences may have repercussions
beyond this sphere. Hidden behind the terminology of “proportionality” and “gateways” lies the
deeper question of whether obtaining possession will in the future become dependent on fair
outcomes, with the tensions continuing to reveal as much about the fluctuating state of human rights as
they do about the conflicting pressures within land law. Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010]
UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 and Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 are
landmark Supreme Court cases, which place English domestic law in closer harmony with the
jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights, by qualifying an automatic right to
possession. Enabling elements of unpredictability to determine the outcome of possession proceedings
creates problems for traditionalists used to crystalline rules, specifically designed to discourage
litigation.
This article examines six developments emerging from the quandary in which English judges
have found themselves as a result of the tensions between certainty and fairness: first, the gradual
diminution of the “wide margin of appreciation” of national authorities; second, the modification of
the stance towards human rights in repossession cases; third, difficulties pertaining to proportionality;
fourth, the continuing significance of the Wednesbury test of unreasonableness derived from
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223; fifth, an assessment
of the impact of human rights on proprietary certainty in English land law; and last, whether
possession proceedings will become based on fair outcomes. English land law has traditionally thrived
in its isolation from Europe and civilian systems of law, but has needed disparate and nuanced
approaches over the centuries, with the law evolving to answer different questions at different periods
of history.1 The independence of spirit of the law is being challenged, intensifying questions as to how
far the law can maintain its distinct identity.
* Solicitor, Principal Lecturer, Middlesex University. The author thanks Professor Kevin Gray for his very helpful comments on
a draft of this article. The author is also grateful to the two anonymous referees for their constructive feedback on this article.
All errors and omissions are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author.
1 See Simpson AWB, A History of the Land Law (2nd ed, Clarendon Press, 1986); Anderson JS, Lawyers and the Making of
English Land Law 1832-1940 (Clarendon Press, 1992); Spring E, Law, Land and Family: Aristocratic Inheritance in England
1300 to 1800 (University of North Carolina Press, 1993).
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HUMAN RIGHTS: TENSIONS BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND FAIRNESS
An increasingly important source of downward pressure on English land law is the interpretation and
application of human rights in relation to public authority landowners, not only by the European Court
of Human Rights, but also by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in contrast to the stance taken by
the House of Lords. The focus of the human rights discussion is Art 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, namely the right to respect for the home, subject to interference by a public authority
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The rationale behind this focus is that Art 8
encapsulates the dilemma of whether an individual has acquired new proprietary protection as a result
of the Convention.
English judges were striving to resolve their dilemmas of how to apply Art 8(2)2 for seven years
from Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43; [2004] 1 AC 983 in 2003 until Pinnock in 2010. The law
has in essence swung from one end of the spectrum to the other. At one end is the majority of the
House of Lords in Qazi, Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 and Doherty v
Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367, endeavouring to uphold automatic
rights to possession to bolster certainty and national self-determination. At the other end, in Pinnock
and in Powell, is the dignified acceptance by the unanimous Supreme Court that possession is not
automatic and is subject to proportionality.
The Supreme Court in Pinnock and in Powell has provided long-awaited guidance that a right to
possession by local authority or social housing landowners is qualified by whether the eviction is a
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim in order to comply with human rights obligations.
Pinnock and Powell apply to local authorities and other social landlords to the extent that they are
public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). The actual decision in Pinnock was that the
demoted tenancy regime is compatible with Art 8. Demoted tenancies3 enable local housing
authorities and other social landlords to apply to the court for a demotion order, which terminates the
secure tenancy from the date specified and creates a demoted tenancy in circumstances where the
anti-social conduct or unlawful use, or the threat of such conduct or use, has taken place, and where it
is reasonable to make the order. Subsequently, under the Housing Act 1996 (UK),4 the landlord of a
demoted tenancy may only bring the tenancy to an end by obtaining an order for possession. Powell
was the leading case in three conjoined appeals,5 which dealt in the Powell case itself with a licence
to occupy a dwelling house owned by a local authority, pursuant to its duties towards the homeless,6
and in the other two cases with introductory tenancies.7 Powell followed Pinnock, so that the
propositions applied in Pinnock to demoted tenancies were extended to the cases in Powell.
The reason that Pinnock, and subsequently Powell, are pivotal cases is that, by disapproving of
the approach of the majorities in the House of Lords in Qazi, Kay v Lambeth LBC and Doherty, they
require a rebalancing of English jurisprudence. Pinnock and Powell apply the reasoning of the
European Court of Human Rights analysed in Kay v United Kingdom [2011] HLR 2 and preceding
cases. The judgments of the House of Lords were becoming increasingly unsustainable in the light of
2 Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that: “There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right [the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence] except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
3 Created under the Housing Act 1985 (UK), s 82A.
4 Housing Act 1996 (UK), s 143D.
5 The other cases were Leeds City Council v Hall [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 and Birmingham City Council v Frisby
[2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287.
6 Housing Act 1996 (UK), Pt VII.
7 Housing Act 1996 (UK), Ch 1 of Pt V. An introductory tenancy remains an introductory tenancy until the end of the trial period
of one year (s 125(2)) and does not become a secure tenancy until the end of the trial period. The Supreme Court held that the
Housing Act 1996 (UK), s 127(2), relating to termination of an introductory tenancy, could be read compatibly with the Human
Rights Act 1998 (UK) and given effect to enable the county court judge to deal with a defence which relied on an alleged breach
of Art 8.
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the Court of Human Rights’ decisions. A milestone has been reached with the Supreme Court
acknowledging that it should now accept the minority views of the House of Lords in Qazi, Kay v
Lambeth LBC and Doherty. The minority views were summed up in Pinnock by Lord Neuberger who
stated that:
if our law is to be compatible with article 8, where a court is asked to make an order for possession of
a person’s home at the suit of a local authority, the court must have the power to assess the
proportionality of making the order, and, in making that assessment, to resolve any relevant dispute of
fact.8
The question to be analysed is how far-reaching the decisions in Pinnock and Powell are. Article 8
may be perceived as a new hurdle to the making of a possession order, especially where domestic law
imposes no requirement of reasonableness and gives an unqualified right to an order for possession.
Alternatively, it may be that the decisions align the common law with the European Convention on
Human Rights to the smallest degree possible to conform to the Convention. If that is so, then in most
cases, possession will be virtually automatic and only if there are exceptional circumstances, which
will be narrowly defined, or if the scheme itself is entirely contrary to the Convention, will possession
be resisted on human rights grounds. Lord Neuberger was keen to emphasise the importance of
recognising proprietary claims to possession, making it clear that:
Unencumbered property rights, even where they are enjoyed by a public body such as a local authority,
are of real weight when it comes to proportionality …
… in virtually every case where a residential occupier has no contractual or statutory protection, and the
local authority is entitled to possession as a matter of law, there will be a very strong case for saying
that making an order for possession would be proportionate.9
If that approach is followed then, in the vast majority of cases, Art 8 will have minimal impact.
Gradual diminution of the “wide margin of appreciation” of national
authorities?
Prior to Pinnock, the crux of the differentiation of approach adopted by the judges of the Court of
Human Rights was that the Court of Human Rights’ decisions are based on human and social
concerns. In contrast, until Pinnock, the concerns of the majority (but not the minority) of judges in
English courts were based on proprietary certainty. This was the fundamental underlying divergence in
philosophy between the Court of Human Rights and the majority of the English judiciary who, before
Pinnock, took a frugal approach to the effect of Art 8 on residential possession proceedings. However,
even in the Court of Human Rights there has been salient progression from Buckley v United Kingdom
(1997) 23 EHRR 10110 and Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 1811 to Kay v United
Kingdom. The court in the earlier cases sheltered under the necessity to balance competing interests
and take refuge in “a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities, who are evidently better
placed to make the requisite assessment”.12 This approach in Buckley and Chapman was adopted
despite recognition of the principles and goals of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for
8 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [49].
9 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [54].
10 See Sandland R, “Developing a Jurisprudence of Difference: The Protection of the Human Rights of Travelling Peoples by
the European Court of Human Rights” (2008) 8 HRL Rev 475.
11 Five cases were decided on the same day, the other cases being Beard v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 19, Coster v
United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 20, Lee v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 29, Smith v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR
30.
12 Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 18 at [104].
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the Protection of National Minorities,13 and was partly attributed to signatory states being unable to
agree on methods of implementation of the Framework Convention.14
There was, however, a discernible shift in the Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence after
Chapman, which can be seen in Connors v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 9 at [86] in the court’s
changed stance on the margin of appreciation, which “must be regarded as correspondingly
narrowed”. The court held unanimously that eviction of the gypsy family did violate their Art 8 rights,
and that such eviction was not attended by the requisite procedural safeguards, namely the
requirement to establish proper justification for the serious interference with the applicant’s rights. As
a result, the decision could not be regarded as justified by “pressing social need” or proportionate to
the legitimate aim being pursued. The United Kingdom had not established a legal framework with
sufficient procedural protection. The security of tenure given by the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (UK) to
travellers licensed to station their caravans on privately-owned caravan sites did not apply to local
authority owned sites governed by the Caravan Sites Act 1968 (UK). This signals a discernible
manoeuvre by the court, through the articulation of a positive interpretation of Art 8 rights, resulting in
a concerted policy of positive discrimination in favour of minority groups that suffer widespread and
structural discrimination.15
In McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 40 the Court of Human Rights reinforced a
human rights approach to proprietary entitlement by holding unanimously that the service of a notice
to quit on Mr McCann was a breach of Art 8. The reason was that under the summary procedure
available to a landlord where one joint tenant served notice to quit, Mr McCann was dispossessed of
his home without any possibility of having the proportionality of that measure determined by an
independent tribunal. The court supported the minority view of the judges in the House of Lords in
Kay v Lambeth LBC, and the essence of the rationale of the Court of Human Rights is summed up by
its cursory conclusion:
The court does not accept that the grant of the right to the occupier to raise an issue under Article 8
would have serious consequences for the functioning of the system or for the domestic law of landlord
and tenant.16
This statement, more than any other, arguably epitomises the cardinal disparity between the
standpoints of the Court of Human Rights and the majority view of the House of Lords.
The decision of the Court of Human Rights in Kay v United Kingdom embodied the culmination
of the narrowing of the broad periphery of discretion enjoyed by national authorities. The importance
of the decision was the reinforcement by the court of the principle that applicants must “be able to
have the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal in light of the relevant
principles under art 8 of the convention, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his right of
occupation has come to an end”.17 Since the county court had struck out the applicants’ Art 8
defences, “the procedural safeguards required by Article 8 for the assessment of the proportionality of
the interference were not observed”.18 The Court of Human Rights’ decision in Kay v United Kingdom
laid the foundations for the Supreme Court’s judgment in Pinnock and the consequential doctrinal
shift.
By way of contrast, the margin of appreciation has not been diminished by the Court of Human
Rights in relation to adverse possession claims. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
13 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (1995).
14 Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 18 at [94]. See also Gilbert G, “The Council of Europe and Minority Rights”
(1996) 18 Hum Rts Q 160, examining, inter alia, the potential definitions of minorities, to whom the rights attach, whether they
are human rights and whether legal rights alone are sufficient for minority protection.
15 Sandland, n 10 at 496.
16 McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 40 at [54].
17 Kay v United Kingdom [2011] HLR 2 at [68].
18 Kay v United Kingdom [2011] HLR 2 at [74].
Pascoe
() 1 Prop L Rev 14
Rights in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 4519 held, by a majority of 10
votes to seven, that English law did not violate the right of landowners to peaceful enjoyment of their
possessions under Art 1 of the First Protocol.20 The court stressed that:
In determining whether a fair balance exists, the court recognises that the State enjoys a wide margin of
appreciation, with regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the
consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the
objective of the law of question.21
The statutory provisions under the Limitation Act 1980 (UK), which barred action to recover land
after 12 years of adverse possession, pursued a legitimate aim in the general interest, and the
provisions governing adverse possession under the Land Registration Act 1925 (UK), s 75, regulated
“control of use” and did not deprive the owner of possessions. Furthermore, the absence of
compensation for landowners who lost their title did not constitute a violation of Art 1 of the First
Protocol. The issue is now unlikely to arise under the provisions of the Land Registration Act 2002
(UK), ss 96-98 and Sch 6,22 which introduced a new scheme in relation to adverse possession that
does not have retroactive effect. This scheme strengthens the position of registered proprietors, so that
the mere lapse of time cannot by itself bar the rights of a registered proprietor. In any event, following
Pye it appears that, in the sphere of land law, the margin of appreciation is narrowing, at present, only
in cases of public authority landowners seeking repossession.
Modification of the stance towards human rights in repossession cases
The judgments of Lord Hope in the English cases demonstrate the changes in the approach to human
rights in repossession cases through Art 8(2). Lord Hope was the only judge to have been a judge in
all the pivotal House of Lords and Supreme Court cases23 – Qazi, Kay v Lambeth LBC, Doherty,
Pinnock and Powell – and was in the majority in Qazi, Kay v Lambeth LBC and Doherty.
• Lord Hope in Qazi:
The county court has no discretion as to whether or not it should grant an order for possession in
these circumstances. In domestic law the making of an order for possession follows automatically.
It has not been suggested that the fact that this is what the law provides is itself a violation of
article 8.24
and
contractual and proprietary rights to possession cannot be defeated by a defence based on
article 8.25
• Lord Hope in Kay v Lambeth LBC:
19 See further Cooke E, “A Postscript to Pye” (2008) 59 NILQ 149; Panesar P and Wood J, “Adverse Possession and Article 1
of the European Convention” (2009) 30 Liverpool LR 77; Milo JM, “ECHR 30 August 2007, Pye v United Kingdom: A
Technical Retreat from Private (Property) Law” (2008) 16 ERPL 353; Fox O’Mahony L and Cobb N, “Taxonomies of
Squatting: Unlawful Occupation in a New Legal Order” (2008) 71 MLR 878.
20 Article 1 of the First Protocol states that: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for
by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest
or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
21 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 at [75].
22 The provisions of the Land Registration Act 2002 (UK) did not apply in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46
EHRR 45, because the statutory provision applicable at the time was the Land Registration Act 1925 (UK), s 75.
23 Lord Walker was a judge in four of them, excluding Qazi. Lord Scott (Qazi, Kay v Lambeth LBC, Doherty), Baroness Hale
(Kay v Lambeth LBC, Pinnock, Powell), Lord Brown (Kay v Lambeth LBC, Pinnock, Powell) and Lord Rodger (Doherty,
Pinnock, Powell) were judges in three of them. Lord Bingham (Qazi, Kay v Lambeth LBC), Lord Mance (Doherty, Pinnock) and
Lord Phillips (Pinnock, Powell) were judges in two of them.
24 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43; [2004] 1 AC 983 at [74].
25 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43; [2004] 1 AC 983 at [84].
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A requirement that the article 8 issue must be considered by the court in every case by taking into
account the defendant’s personal circumstances would go further than a reading of these three
cases, taken together and in the light of the prior Strasbourg jurisprudence, will justify.26
and
I do not think that the reasoning of the majority in Qazi should be departed from. But I accept that
the reasoning needs to be clarified. In the light of the subsequent Strasbourg cases I would now
place greater emphasis on the need for the court to provide a remedy in those special cases of a
kind not considered in Qazi where it is seriously arguable that the right to possession which is
afforded by domestic law violates the Convention right. … On balance I think that it would be
better for the issue to be dealt with by way of defence to the proceedings in the county court, to the
extent that the limits on the jurisdiction of that court permit it to do so …27
• Lord Hope in Doherty:
I would allow the appeal. I would remit the case to the judge in the High Court so that he can
review the reasons that the council has given for serving a notice to quit to obtain vacant
possession of the plots that the first defendant and his family occupy. It will be for the judge to
resolve any dispute that he needs to resolve about the facts and, having done so, to determine
whether the decision to terminate the first defendant’s licence on the grounds stated in its
particulars of claim, and having regard to the length of time that the first defendant and his family
have resided on the site, was reasonable.28
• Lord Hope in Powell:
This court held [in Pinnock] that those cases,29 together with Kay v United Kingdom … provided
a clear and constant line of jurisprudence to the effect that any person at risk of being dispossessed
of his home at the suit of a local authority should in principle have the right to question the
proportionality of the measure and to have it determined by an independent tribunal in the light of
article 8: para 45. The decision in Doherty v Birmingham City Council … had shown that our
domestic law was already moving in that direction, and the time had come to accept and apply the
jurisprudence of the European court. So, where a court is asked to make an order for possession of
someone’s home by a local authority, the court must have the power to assess the proportionality
of making the order and, in making that assessment, to resolve any relevant dispute of fact:
para 49.30
Lord Hope has progressed significantly from the visceral fear he expressed in Qazi of losing
control of the legal system, and he justifies the change by being obliged to follow European
jurisprudence. The House of Lords, sitting as a seven-member panel, sought to reconcile Qazi and
Connors in the conjoined appeals of Kay v Lambeth LBC and accepted that, in so far as the ratio of
Qazi was that the enforcement of a right to possession in accordance with the domestic law of
property could never be incompatible with Art 8, this principle had to be modified in the light of
Connors. While the case did not bolt the door against challenges under Art 8 in possession cases, it
left open only the smallest of cracks.31
Subsequent to the House of Lords decision in Kay v Lambeth LBC, the Court of Human Rights in
McCann upheld a human rights approach to Art 8 and the minority view of the House of Lords in Kay
26 Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 at [109].
27 Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 at [113].
28 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [57].
29 Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 913, Cosic v Croatia
(2011) 52 EHRR 39, Zehentner v Austria (2011) 52 EHRR 22 and Paulic v Croatia (App No 3572/06, 22 October 2009).
30 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [7].
31 Bright S, “Article 8 Again in the House of Lords: Kay v Lambeth LBC; Leeds CC v Price” [2006] 70 Conv 294 at 308. See
also Hughes D and Davis M, “Human Rights and the Triumph of Property: The Marginalisation of the European Convention on
Human Rights in Housing Law” [2006] 70 Conv 526; Davis M and Hughes D, “Gateways or Barriers? Joint Tenants,
Possession Claims and Article 8” [2010] 74 Conv 57.
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v Lambeth LBC. The House of Lords, sitting as a five-member panel in Doherty,32 would not overrule
the decision in Kay v Lambeth LBC, which had been reached by a seven-member panel, and restated
that the basic rule, as laid down by the majority in Qazi, and reaffirmed by the majority in Kay v
Lambeth LBC, is good law. Lord Hope reaffirmed that the facts in Connors and Blecic v Croatia
(2006) 43 EHRR 4833 were entirely different from those in Qazi. Connors was labelled an
“exceedingly rare case where the legislative code or, indeed, the common law is impeachable on
human rights grounds”.34 It was a pity that, in Doherty, the House of Lords did not take the
opportunity to take a bold approach to Art 8. However, in Pinnock, and subsequently Powell, the
Supreme Court rose to the challenge of aligning English law with the requirements of the Court of
Human Rights, and the question is how far, how deep and how wide this realignment will go.
Difficulties pertaining to proportionality
The English judiciary is still struggling with the threshold for when proportionality is triggered. The
Supreme Court’s rejection, in Pinnock,35 of the proposition that “it will only be in ‘very highly
exceptional cases’ that it will be appropriate for the court to consider a proportionality argument”, is
welcome, because this avoids the difficulties and complications of defining when “very highly
exceptional” circumstances arise. “The question is always whether the eviction is a proportionate
means of achieving a legitimate aim.”36 Yet, further on in his judgment in Pinnock, Lord Neuberger
appears to introduce a test of “exceptionality”, specifically for determination of the remedy.
Lord Neuberger stated that:
if domestic law justifies an outright order for possession, the effect of article 8 may, albeit in exceptional
cases, justify (in ascending order of effect) granting an extended period for possession, suspending the
order for possession on the happening of an event, or even refusing the order altogether.37
The problem with this approach is that, if eviction is not a proportionate means of achieving a
legitimate aim, the appropriate remedy must follow, and there should not be a threshold of
“exceptionality” for the remedy to be awarded. What Lord Neuberger is, in effect, advocating, is a
threshold of “exceptionality” as a trigger for proportionality.
The test used by Lord Hope in Powell is a test of whether proportionality is “seriously arguable”
since:
The court will only have to consider whether the making of a possession order is proportionate if the
issue has been raised by the occupier and it has crossed the high threshold of being seriously arguable.38
Lord Phillips goes even further than Lord Hope in Powell by agreeing with the test of “very
highly exceptional cases” in relation to introductory tenancies and, in his opinion, a defendant must
demonstrate that he has “substantial grounds” for advancing a proportionality argument.39
Lord Phillips also extends this principle to homelessness cases. Lord Phillips appears to be retreating
to the position prior to Pinnock by concluding that:
32 The appellant, a gypsy, had been evicted from a caravan site owned by the respondent local authority, having been served with
a notice to quit by the local authority on the basis that it required vacant possession to carry out essential improvement works.
The appellant and his family had been resident on the site for 17 years by the time they were evicted.
33 See also Loveland I, “A Tale of Two Trespassers: Reconsidering the Impact of the Human Rights Act on Rights of Residence
in Rented Housing: Part 1” [2009] 2 EHRLR 148.
34 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [34], quoting from Lord Nicholls in Kay v
Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 at [54].
35 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [51].
36 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [52].
37 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [62].
38 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [33].
39 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [92].
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the statement that it will only be in rare cases that a valid proportionality challenge can be raised by
way of defence to a possession order applies equally to repossession of accommodation provided under
Part VII.40
His statement may, therefore, negate the advantages of having a single judgment delivered in
Pinnock by Lord Neuberger, since different thresholds are being proposed by different judges.
However, it may be that Lord Phillips is struggling with two rather different thresholds – the
proportionality threshold and the threshold to be overcome at the first possession hearing where the
occupier needs a defence which is substantial.41
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court judgments are very clear on the legitimate aims the authority
can rely on to determine proportionality. The proportionality of the possession order is supported by
the fact that making the order would serve to vindicate the housing provider’s ownership rights and
enable the authority to comply with its public duties in relation to the allocation and management of
its housing stock.42 Lord Neuberger in Pinnock added that “in many cases (such as this appeal) other
cogent reasons, such as the need to remove a source of nuisance to neighbours, may support the
proportionality of dispossessing the occupiers”,43 which will be an important factor in many cases.
Lord Phillips in Powell was concerned that:
these appeals raise a number of questions which are not clearly answered by the decision in Pinnock.
Foremost among these is the question of the matters to which the court must pay regard when an issue
of proportionality is raised.44
Yet an analysis of Lord Phillips’ judgment leaves the distinct impression that his judgment goes little
further than Pinnock in providing general advice. The Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance
on how to balance an occupier’s personal circumstances against the local authority’s legitimate aims
in determining the proportionality of making a possession order. Direction is needed, in particular, “in
respect of occupants who are vulnerable as a result of mental illness, physical or learning disability,
poor health or frailty”, referred to by Lord Neuberger in Pinnock.45 This was an issue highlighted in
that case by the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
In Powell, Lord Hope avoids dealing with specific cases in which the personal circumstances of
occupiers will trump the local authority’s ownership rights. The only guidance given by Lord Hope is
that:
The court need be concerned only with the occupier’s personal circumstances and any factual objections
she may raise and … with the question whether making the order for possession would be lawful and
proportionate. If it decides to entertain the point because it is seriously arguable, it must give a reasoned
decision as to whether or not a fair balance would be struck by making the order that is being sought by
the local authority: Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v Ukraine given 2 December 2010, para 44.46
No specific examples are given, and the Supreme Court has arguably reneged on its pivotal role to
provide guidance to lower courts to ensure parameters of consistency.
Lord Phillips arguably adopts a more human rights based approach than Lord Hope. Lord Phillips
tackles an important element of the issue when he states:
40 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [113], referring to the Housing Act 1996 (UK), Pt VII.
41 See Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), r 55.8(2), which applies where “the claim is genuinely disputed on grounds which
appear to be substantial”.
42 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [52] and Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC
8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [35]. In Kryvitskyy v Ukraine (App No 30856/03, 2 December 2010) at [46], the Strasbourg Court
indicated that the first aim on its own will not suffice where the owner is the state itself, but taken together, the twin aims will
satisfy the legitimate aim requirement.
43 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [52].
44 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [75].
45 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [64].
46 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [37]. Lord Hope also uses the terminology “lawful and
proportionate” at [44].
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It is possible to envisage a proportionality challenge before the judge being based on exceptional
personal circumstances which have nothing to do with the reasons for seeking the possession order.47
But he does not provide any advice on how county courts should deal with such a challenge.
Lord Phillips recognised that an attack on the proportionality of dispossession is more normal where it
amounts to an attack on the reasons given to the tenant for seeking the possession order, but again
does not grapple with the more difficult issues relating to exceptional personal circumstances.48 An
important consequence of the decisions is that landlords will need to overhaul the internal
management of their housing procedures to demonstrate that all factors have been taken into account
in reaching a proportionate decision. This will inevitably require written documentation demonstrating
the considerations taken into account in reaching a considered decision prior to initiating proceedings
for possession.
As Arden has pointed out, in Strasbourg the subjectivity of the question does not lead to vast
differences, because there are only 47 judges, sitting in five sections of nine or 10 each, whereas there
are more than 3,000 county court judges (circuit, district, recorder and deputy) who may need to
exercise judgment.49 Arden is harsh in his criticisms of Pinnock and Powell for the paucity of theory,
and the absence of the rigorously reasoned, precedent-based approach for which the Supreme Court
and, prior to that, the House of Lords, has been world-renowned.50 Arden’s view is that the Strasbourg
decisions relied on in Pinnock and Powell are noticeable for their brevity and contain “templates” –
paragraphs cut and pasted from earlier decisions – which reflect a procedural element to Art 8.
However, any jurisdiction based on precedent will use template paragraphs, and the jurisdiction is as
yet immature. It was inevitable in the long term that the United Kingdom would follow the
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, and that the Supreme Court would defer to Strasbourg, not only
in the conclusion but also in its approach. The court did, however, recognise in Pinnock51 that the
wide implications of the obligation under Art 8(2) to consider the proportionality “will have to be
worked out”, which “is best left to the good sense and experience of judges sitting in the county
court”. This may be an abdication of responsibility or, construed in a more benevolent light, may be a
realistic assessment of the practicalities of the way in which Art 8(2) needs to operate.
Continuing significance of Wednesbury test of unreasonableness?
The fundamental concept utilised in domestic judicial review cases has conventionally been
“Wednesbury unreasonableness”, derived from Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v
Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 at 230; that is, where a decision is “so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have come to it”, subsequently termed “irrationality”.52 Prior to
Pinnock, there had been considerable judicial tension in relation to the grounds for judicial review
where the statute gives a public authority an unqualified right to recover possession. Lord Hope in Kay
v Lambeth LBC53 and subsequently in Doherty54 set out gateways (a) and (b) as constituting the only
grounds upon which a decision can be challenged. Gateway (a) is the compatibility challenge, where
it is arguable that the domestic law itself, which enables the court to make the possession order, is
incompatible with Art 8. Gateway (b) is the challenge on conventional judicial review grounds,
challenging the decision of a public authority to recover possession as an improper exercise of its
47 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [91].
48 In Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [111]-[113], Lord Phillips tackles Issue 3 – the type of
factual issues which will be relevant to any proportionality determination, but the scope of that discussion is very narrow.
49 Arden A, “Whose Rights? Whose Reasons?” (2011) 14 JHL 47 at 48.
50 Arden, n 49 at 50.
51 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [57].
52 See also Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 410 per Lord Diplock.
53 Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 at [110].
54 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [37]-[55].
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powers on the ground that “the decision is one which no reasonable person would consider
justifiable”,55 which encompasses whether the decision “was arbitrary, unreasonable or disproportion-
ate”.56
Although proportionality is not a distinct ground for review in non-Convention rights cases, even
in such cases:
the time has come to recognise that this principle [proportionality] is part of English administrative law,
not only when judges are dealing with Community acts but also when they are dealing with acts subject
to domestic law. Trying to keep the Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate compartments
seems to me to be unnecessary and confusing.57
There have been judicial calls for the abandonment of the Wednesbury test, with recognition that only
the House of Lords/Supreme Court can “perform its burial rites”.58
However, there are different levels of review in different types of cases, and the problem with
proportionality, as opposed to traditional judicial review, has been that it is akin to ruling on the
substance or merits of the case, infringing on the separation of powers between the Executive and
judiciary. Yet, even in this area, Lord Hope in Doherty59 recognised that “it would be unduly
formalistic to confine the review strictly to traditional Wednesbury grounds”, since the considerations
which can be taken into account are wider. This raises the issue as to where the boundaries lie between
reasonableness and personal circumstances, especially since Lord Hope in Doherty60 explicitly
recognised subjective factors under the head of reasonableness by stating that “the length of time that
the first defendant and his family have resided on the site” is relevant, thus potentially allowing for
personal circumstances to be smuggled into gateway (b). Despite regarding Connors as exceptional,
the result of the decision in Doherty was that the exception had the potential to become the norm
through circuitous means, resulting in a latent feasibility for the fusion of the two gateways. Even
Lord Hope in Doherty61 recognised that, “the two routes, or ‘gateways’, may be said to work together
to address the incompatibility due to the lack of a procedural safeguard, which is the fundamental
point that is at issue in this case”.62
Gateway (b) is, therefore, not limited to judicial review which must be brought in the High Court
with permission. Such permission was not usually granted where the challenge depended on disputed
issues of fact. To be compliant with Art 8, it must be possible to challenge the lawfulness of the
decision of the local authority to recover possession by way of defence in the possession proceedings.
When Lord Walker highlighted in Doherty63 the irony of the verbal incongruity of “conventional
judicial review grounds” being used to mean “grounds that have nothing to do with the European
55 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [52] per Lord Hope, referring to Wandsworth
London Borough Council v Winder [1985] AC 461.
56 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [52] per Lord Hope, repeating what he stated in
Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 at [114].
57 R (On the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
[2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 AC 295 at [51] per Lord Slynn.
58 R (Association of British Civilian Internees (Far East Region) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473; [2003]
QB 1397 at [35] per Dyson LJ.
59 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [55].
60 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [55].
61 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [53].
62 Lord Walker agreed in Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [106] that: “The two
gateways are not necessarily exclusive alternatives”.
63 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [109].
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Convention on Human Rights”, the path ahead became unequivocal, with the consequence that
proportionality has arguably now been accepted as “an ‘indigenous’ ground of judicial review”.64
The decisions in Pinnock and Powell are welcome, because they offer alternative ways of
channelling defences in addition to gateway (b). The Wednesbury test remains important, and
advocates should always plead both jurisdictions. The reason is that there may be cases where the
actions of the public authority in seeking possession are proportionate, particularly in view of the
significance of unencumbered property rights and public obligations of estate management, but the
actions may still be perverse in the Wednesbury sense. Gateway (b) in such circumstances will assume
a significance of its own, examining natural justice, legitimate expectations and procedural
irregularity. Gateway (b) has not relied on Art 8 in the past, since it derived from the common law
jurisdiction in Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder [1985] AC 461. Although “there is an
overlap between the traditional grounds of review and the approach of proportionality”,65 it is clear
that the “differences in approach between the traditional grounds of review and the proportionality
approach may therefore sometimes yield different results”.66 Therefore, following Pinnock and
Powell, the Wednesbury test should not be regarded as diminished in significance and must not be
consigned to the graveyard of antiquated doctrines.
The impact of human rights on proprietary certainty in English land law
The advantage of an automatic right to possession is that it provides certainty, creating clear rights and
obligations and avoids inconsistency between decisions, increased costs and consequent delays. By
way of contrast, as a result of Pinnock and Powell, requiring possession to be subject to Art 8(2) is
blurring clear and distinct property rules and may result in unpredictability. As Rose has argued, the
problem of substitution of “mud” rules for “crystal” ones is that we substitute fuzzy, ambiguous rules
for what seem to be perfectly clear demarcations of entitlement.67 The result of Art 8 is the acquisition
of a new form of proprietary protection or the engrafting of a “new equity” onto property
relationships.68 Equity ameliorates the harshness of the law and, similarly, Art 8(2) takes the hard edge
off harsh rules to give proprietary protection to an occupier in circumstances where an occupier would
otherwise have no defence to an order for possession.
If Qazi is regarded as the zenith of certainty in land law, with the majority of the House of Lords
refusing to allow Art 8(2) to import elements of inconsistency into an automatic right to possession,
then the issue is the effect of Pinnock and Powell on that thesis. It is arguable that the practical reality
is that Pinnock and Powell may not in fact deviate far from that thesis. Since both cases ascribe great
significance to unencumbered property law rights, these rights, together with public law obligations,
present an almost unassailable case. This is especially so where prescriptive statutory regimes are
concerned, which require pre-court bureaucratic review processes; and even more so where the
pre-court review process is a reasonableness requirement, as in the case of the demoted tenancy
regime.
Analysing the Powell case itself, if Ms Powell had not been offered suitable alternative
accommodation, the case would have been remitted to the county court for a consideration of Art 8
proportionality in the light of her personal circumstances.69 Giving effect to the order for possession
would make Ms Powell homeless again, so the local authority would be obliged to rehouse her unless
she was found to be intentionally homeless or not to have a priority need. By the time of the Supreme
Court decision, Ms Powell had four children under the age of six. The original reason that Hounslow
64 A phrase used by Loveland I, “A Tale of Two Trespassers: Reconsidering the Impact of the Human Rights Act on Rights of
Residence in Rented Housing: Part 2” [2009] 4 EHRLR 495 at 499. See also Loveland I, “Defending Ground 8 Residential
Possession Claims Through Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights” [2009] 73 Conv 396.
65 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 at [27] per Lord Steyn.
66 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532 at [28] per Lord Steyn.
67 Rose CM, “Crystals and Mud in Property Law” (1987-1988) 40 Stan L Rev 577 at 578.
68 See Gray K and Gray SF, Land Law (Core Text Series) (6th ed, Oxford University Press, 2009) at [1.132]-[1.133].
69 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [66].
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issued a claim for possession of the premises was that there were substantial arrears of rent, which
were not covered by the initial credit of housing benefit and which remained unpaid. By the time of
the Supreme Court hearing, the family was in receipt of various benefits including housing benefit
which covered all of the rental liability. In practice, it is unlikely that a county court would hold that
the decision of a public authority landowner is not proportionate, because the tenant’s personal
circumstances will place the local authority under an obligation to rehouse. Therefore, it will only be
extremely rarely that unencumbered property rights will be undermined, because of the extensive
nature of landlords’ public law obligations.
However, if a court does exercise its discretion not to grant possession, the question is what type
of tenancy the occupiers will have. County court judges would benefit from guidance from the
Supreme Court on: whether the determined tenancy would merely be revived; whether a “contingent
tenancy” would arise which would continue, for example, until the children leave home; and whether
the tenancy would automatically become secure if it was secure prior to the termination of the
tenancy.70 Furthermore, the acceptance by the Supreme Court that certain statutory and procedural
provisions may need to be revisited71 is recognition of the overhaul required to make housing law
compliant with Art 8. The flexible tenancy regime proposed in the Localism Bill (UK), with its written
notice, reasons, review and time period provisions, may comply with the principles enunciated in
Pinnock and Powell, and time will tell how the mandatory ground for possession will interact with
Art 8. The aim of the legislation may be to make successful proportionality challenges less likely to
succeed, but there is no evidence of this being the rationale.
English courts have not traditionally taken a rights-based approach to social housing and have in
effect adopted a “managerial” approach; the focus being not on the tenants as right-holders, but on the
needs of local authorities to distribute their scarce resources effectively.72 The Human Rights Act
presents a challenge to this outlook, threatening to shift the focus from the needs of the landlord to the
rights of occupiers. The rationale that the local authority has the right to take possession because this
vindicates its right to take possession is circular. The distribution and management of housing stock is
conducive to sound estate management, but is the antithesis of an approach based on individual
rights.73
It is significant that the pragmatic approach adopted by the Supreme Court may paradoxically
redress the balance in favour of local authorities and social landlords. A court only has to consider
whether it should conduct a proportionality exercise where a tenant requests, which weights the
decision in favour of the landowner. The judges agreed that the court should proceed on the basis that
the landlord has sound management reasons for seeking a possession order.74 Lord Hope is noticeably
concerned to retain the presumption in favour of the landowner by rejecting a “structured approach”
argued for by Mr Luba, counsel for the tenant, Ms Powell.75 A “structured approach” to the issue of
proportionality would require the interests of the local authority to be balanced against those of the
occupier, and such an approach was rejected because it would destroy the distinction between secure
and non-secure tenancies. Lord Hope is endeavouring to retain the distinction between secure and
non-secure tenancies, which is a pivotal distinction to maintain.
70 Loveland I, “The Shifting Sands of Article 8 Jurisprudence in English Housing Law” [2011] EHRLR 151 at 165.
71 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [63], though see Hounslow LBC v Powell
[2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [57]-[64] where Lord Hope declined to make a declaration of incompatibility in relation
to Housing Act 1980 (UK), s 89.
72 Latham A, “Talking Without Speaking, Hearing Without Listening? Evictions, the Law Lords and the European Court of
Human Rights” [2011] PL 730 at 732.
73 Latham, n 72 at 741.
74 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [35].
75 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [40]. Mr Luba used Huang v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2007] 2 AC 167 at [19]-[20] in support of his proposition, but Lord Hope in Powell at [41] rejected it, arguing that
it may be appropriate in contexts such as immigration control which was the issue in that case, but not in the context of this
case.
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Proportionality, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, therefore restores a level of autonomy to
national authorities to enable prioritising of social and economic factors together with relevant policy
considerations, so long as proportionality has been determined. The European Court has offered little
guidance as to the meaning of proportionality, and the English cases have not concerned the
substantive meaning of proportionality, but rather the procedural requirement for independent
determination.76 The practical consequence of the cases is that the extent of the extra protection which
proportionality will offer social housing tenants will be gauged on a case by case basis. The reality,
however, is that the impact of Art 8 on proprietary certainty in English law may not be as drastic as
was initially anticipated following the decision in Pinnock.
Examining other areas of land law, one area in which Art 8 and Art 1 of the First Protocol may
have impact is mortgagee possession cases. In Horsham Properties Group Ltd v Clark [2008] EWHC
2327; [2009] 1 WLR 1255, Briggs J held that the exercise of the statutory power of sale under the Law
of Property Act 1925 (UK), s 101, after a relevant default by the mortgagor, was not a deprivation of
possessions within Art 1, and the claimant was entitled to possession of the property. In making that
decision, Briggs J relied on the House of Lords decision in Qazi, which means that cases involving
facts similar to Horsham will now have to be re-evaluated. The potential scope of the European
Convention on Human Rights in mortgagee possession cases is open to debate, and Lindberg has
argued that the conjunctive factors of state encouragement of home ownership, financial deregulation,
inadequate legal protection and an ineffective regulatory framework have precipitated home
repossessions to the extent that the United Kingdom may be in violation of its positive obligations
under Art 8.77
There have been some ramifications from human rights in relation to orders for sale under the
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (UK), s 14. In National Westminster Bank Plc v
Rushmer [2010] EWHC 554; [2010] FLR 362, Arnold J held that the power to enforce a charging
order was compatible with the Convention, since:
it will ordinarily be sufficient for this purpose for the court to give due consideration to the factors
specified in section 15 of TOLATA. That will ordinarily enable the court to balance the creditor’s rights,
which include its rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol, with the Article 8 rights of those affected
by an order for sale.78
Arnold J does not:
rule out the possibility that there may be circumstances in which it is necessary for the court explicitly
to consider whether an order for sale is a proportionate interference with the Article 8 rights of those
affected, but I do not consider that this will always be necessary.79
Prior to Rushmer, the courts had not considered the effect of human rights under these provisions of
the 1996 Act.80 Arnold J adopts a balanced approach, emphasising that the family’s interests were
balanced against those of the bank, and articulating the importance of taking Art 8 into consideration,
thus demonstrating that the impact of human rights has spread to this area.
On an application for sale by a beneficiary’s trustee in bankruptcy, the criteria in the Insolvency
Act 1986 (UK), s 335A(2), apply, although after one year “the court shall assume, unless the
circumstances of the case are exceptional, that the interests of the bankrupt’s creditors outweigh all
other considerations”.81 In Barca v Mears [2004] EWHC 2170; [2005] 2 FLR 1 at [40]-[42], Nicholas
Strauss QC queried whether it was incompatible with Convention rights to follow the narrow approach
76 Arden, n 49 at 48.
77 See Lindberg PT, “Defend My Castle: Is the UK in Violation of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights?”
(2010) Denning LJ 1 at 33.
78 National Westminster Bank Plc v Rushmer [2010] EWHC 554; [2010] FLR 362 at [50].
79 National Westminster Bank Plc v Rushmer [2010] EWHC 554; [2010] FLR 362 at [50].
80 See, eg Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v Bell [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 920, First National Bank Plc v Achampong
[2003] EWCA Civ 487; [2004] 1 FCR 18, Edwards v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc [2004] EWHC 1745; [2005] 1 FCR 139.
81 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), s 335A(3).
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to exceptional circumstances taken by the majority in Re Citro [1991] Ch 142 and wondered whether
“a shift in emphasis in the interpretation of the statute may be necessary to achieve compatibility with
the Convention”.82 He emphasised that “a reconsideration of the sections in the light of the
Convention” and “without the possibly undue bias in favour of the creditors’ property interests” could
make these sections compatible with the Convention.83 However, in Nicholls v Lan [2006] EWHC
1255; [2007] 1 FLR 744, the court held that the rights of the bankrupt’s wife under the Human Rights
Act had not been breached, and the view of the judge, Paul Morgan QC, was that:
I do not see that the statutory test, leading to a balancing exercise, is inconsistent with the qualified
nature of the rights enshrined in Article 8 and in Article 1 of the First Protocol. Indeed, it might be
contended that section 335A precisely captures what is required by Article 8 and Article 1 of the First
Protocol.84
Nicholls v Lan has therefore diluted the misgivings expressed in Barca v Mears. In the long term,
however, it is likely that the Convention will have an impact on the interpretation of “exceptional
circumstances”.85
In the area of adverse possession, the Court of Appeal in Ofulue v Bossert [2008] EWCA Civ 7;
[2009] Ch 1 (taken on appeal to the House of Lords on other grounds) followed Pye and held that the
law on adverse possession is compliant with the Convention, and there were no special circumstances
in that case justifying departing from that decision. Arden LJ recognised, in Ofulue v Bossert,86 the
wide margin of appreciation given by the European Court to contracting states in Pye and held that
there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised, with the consequence that there was no violation of Art 1 of the First Protocol.
“Special circumstances” were given a narrow and limited definition by Arden LJ, clarifying that
“special circumstances justifying departure might exist if the domestic court were satisfied that the
Strasbourg court has misunderstood the effect of domestic law”.87 Arden LJ was unwilling to
distinguish the decision in Pye based on the facts of the case or by reference to the applicability of the
policy reasons for adverse possession identified by the Law Commission.88
In relation to overreaching, human rights have not yet had an impact. The mechanism of
overreaching is a statutory device to enable owners of a legal estate to make a disposition free of the
beneficial interests that previously bound the estate, as long as the proceeds of sale or other capital
money are paid to at least two trustees or a trust corporation.89 City of London Building Society v
Flegg [1988] AC 54 demonstrated how two elderly and innocent beneficial owners lost their home and
their savings due to the operation of overreaching.90 In State Bank of India v Sood [1997] 1 WLR
1568, the interests of the beneficiaries were not protected by the two trustee rule, which did not have
to be complied with because there was an overdraft mortgage and no capital money arose
contemporaneously with the disposition. In National Westminster Bank Plc v Malhan [2004] EWCA
Civ 847; [2004] 2 P & CR DG 9, the Vice Chancellor would not countenance the suggestion that the
discrepancy in treatment between the position where there is one trustee as opposed to two trustees
82 Barca v Mears [2004] EWHC 2170; [2005] 2 FLR 1 at [41].
83 Barca v Mears [2004] EWHC 2170; [2005] 2 FLR 1 at [42]. See further Baker A, “The Judicial Approach to ‘Exceptional
Circumstances’ in Bankruptcy: The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998” [2010] 74 Conv 352.
84 Nicholls v Lan [2006] EWHC 1255; [2007] 1 FLR 744 at [43].
85 In Everitt v Budhram [2009] EWHC 1219; [2010] Ch 170, the Convention does not appear to have been raised at all in
argument, but the court did suspend the possession order, due to the husband’s mental health and medical condition which
constituted exceptional circumstances. The suspension was until the earlier of two events, either for one year or for three months
after possession had been ordered against the husband.
86 Ofulue v Bossert [2008] EWCA Civ 7; [2009] Ch 1 at [50]-[57].
87 Ofulue v Bossert [2008] EWCA Civ 7; [2009] Ch 1 at [32].
88 Ofulue v Bossert [2008] EWCA Civ 7; [2009] Ch 1 at [52]-[53].
89 Law of Property Act 1925 (UK), s 2 and s 27(2).
90 See Thompson MP, “Dispositions by Trustees for Sale” [1988] 52 Conv 108; Harpum C, “Overreaching, Trusts of Land and
Proprietary Estoppel” (2000) 116 LQR 341; Jackson N, “Overreaching in Registered Land Law” (2006) 69 MLR 214.
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might amount to a breach of Art 8, Art 1 of the First Protocol, or Art 14 (prohibition of
discrimination). As the Vice Chancellor stressed, he did not have to comment on the Human Rights
Act, because the facts arose before the Act came into force. He agreed that the arguments for the Bank
as to compatibility had “much force”,91 but one of the cases he cited in support of that proposition was
Qazi. It is likely that a case with facts similar to Flegg or Sood will lead to a reconsideration of the
statutory provisions due to the severe effects of overreaching on the beneficiaries in actual occupation.
It may be time for a rebalancing of the competing interests, so that the impediments to an
unencumbered title by purchasers and mortgagees receive the scrutiny which they deserve.
Possession proceedings based on fair outcomes?
In relation to possession proceedings, the decisions in Pinnock and Powell may be viewed as a turning
point, leading the way in the future to a broad-based system of law. The modern Strasbourg
formulation is “proportionality and reasonableness” as highlighted by Lord Neuberger in Pinnock who
stated that:
no order for possession can be made against a secure tenant unless, inter alia, it is reasonable to make
the order. Any factor which has to be taken into account, or any dispute of fact which has to be
resolved, for the purpose of assessing proportionality under article 8(2), would have to be taken into
account or resolved for the purpose of assessing reasonableness …92
Reasonableness and proportionality appear to be equated with no conceptual differentiation
between them. Article 8(2) may evolve to remove the most fundamental distinction between cases
where reasonableness is and is not a requirement for eviction. As Lord Neuberger recognised in
Pinnock, where domestic law imposes no requirement of reasonableness, and gives an unqualified
right to possession, “the court’s obligation under article 8(2) … does represent a potential new
obstacle to the making of an order for possession. The wide implications of this obligation will have to
be worked out”.93 The same view was taken by Lord Hope and Lord Phillips in Powell.94 There is,
however, no exact equivalence between proportionality and reasonableness; for example, because
secure/assured tenancy status renders irrelevant factors which might from a proportionality perspective
point towards eviction being proportionate.95 Therefore, it remains to be seen whether a more nuanced
approach to reasonableness and proportionality, which acknowledges the subtle differentiation
between the two concepts with recognition of their divergent provenances, will materialise in the
future.
From the perspective of the landlord, failing to give a landlord possession when he is entitled
under domestic law is perceived as an infringement of his right to peaceful enjoyment of his property
under Art 1 of the First Protocol. However, the modern approach of the European Court of Human
Rights is to take a more robust approach to the protection of a private tenant’s rights under Art 8.96 In
Belchikova v Russia (App No 2408/06, March 25 2010), the European Court of Human Rights was
clearly of the view that Art 8 was engaged where the applicant faced the loss of her home due to a
possession order, even though the claimants were private individuals. Indeed, the applicant lost
because the decision to evict her was proportionate. In Zehentner v Austria (2011) 52 EHRR 22, there
was violation of Art 8 where the applicant, who was evicted from her home, lacked legal capacity, and
a guardian was subsequently appointed due to her severe mental illness. Similarly, in Orlic v Croatia
91 National Westminster Bank Plc v Malhan [2004] EWCA Civ 847; [2004] 2 P & CR DG9 at [53]. See also Birmingham
Midshires Mortgage Services Ltd v Sabherwal (2000) 80 P & CR 256 at [34], where Robert Walker LJ refused to consider the
effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), because it was not yet in force and the mortgage lender was not a public body.
92 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [55].
93 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [57].
94 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 WLR 287 at [34] and [79] respectively.
95 Loveland, n 70 at 164, giving the example in fn 51 of extreme under-occupation of premises not being a ground for possession
against a secure or assured tenant.
96 Luba J, “Is There a ‘Human Rights Defence’ to a Possession Claim Brought by a Private Landlord?” (2011) 15 L & T Review
79 at 80.
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(App No 48833/07, June 21 2011), the court did not accept that the grant of the right to the applicant
to raise an issue under Art 8 would have serious consequences for domestic law and held that there
had been a violation of Art 8.
Consequently, how could the law become based on fairness? Pressure from the European Court of
Human Rights for a more even balancing of interests of the owner and occupier may lead to a shift
further towards the interests of the occupier. Article 8 proportionality may position personal
circumstances of occupiers as central to an evaluation of what is “necessary in a democratic society”
under Art 8(2). As counsel will be arguing on behalf of occupiers who “are vulnerable as a result of
mental illness, physical or learning disability, poor health or frailty”97 or as a result of myriad other
circumstances, judges’ sympathies with occupiers may outweigh owners’ legitimate aims. While
social housing is in short supply, delays in eviction will be to the detriment of others in need of
housing, but such rights are not adequately protected by Art 8.
The effect of Art 8(2) on landowners has the potential, therefore, to invert certainty-based land
law principles and replace them with justice-based land law. It is a moot point whether the European
Convention impacts only on public authority landowners and, indeed, the issue was not settled in the
Supreme Court by Lord Neuberger in Pinnock. Lord Neuberger emphasised that “nothing we say is
intended to bear on cases where the person seeking the order for possession is a private landowner”98
and “[n]o doubt in such cases article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention will have a part to play,
but it is preferable for this court to express no view on the issue until it arises and has to be
determined”.99 Lord Neuberger did not refer to Lord Hope’s view expressed in Kay v Lambeth LBC100
that his judgment applied to public and private landlords. Since it is unlawful for a public authority to
act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right, and a public authority includes a court or
tribunal, the debate about horizontal application focuses on whether a court deciding a case must
decide in accordance with the Convention in cases between private parties as well as against a public
authority. The argument in favour of vertical effect only is that the rights are rights only against
national governments, or their public law emanations, and not rights against citizens, so that
Convention rights can only be asserted against public bodies.101 The contrary view has its foundations
in the opinion that the disjunctive manner in which the two limbs of Art 8, for example, are expressed,
indicates clearly that it is capable of much wider meaning, so that the first limb is stating an unlimited
general right, and the provision about public authorities in the second limb is necessary in order to
provide for exceptions.102
A further complication is the blurring of the boundaries between private landlords as opposed to
public authority landlords. Private landlords cannot be treated as a distinct category. One sub-category
is private landlords who provide accommodation for homeless people, and Lord Mance in YL v
Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27; [2008] 1 AC 95 at [85] left open the question whether
private landlords fall within the Human Rights Act, s 6(3)(b),103 whenever the accommodation is paid
for by public funding, even if only by housing benefit. The expansion to this category of landlords
97 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [64] per Lord Neuberger.
98 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [4].
99 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441 at [50].
100 Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465 at [64] and [75].
101 Buxton R, “The Human Rights Act and Private Law” (2000) 116 LQR 48 at 50-52, whose view is that the Human Rights Act
1998 (UK) does not create private law rights.
102 Wade HWR, “Horizons of Horizontality” (2000) 116 LQR 217 at 218-219, who argues that courts must give effect to
Convention rights, so that full horizontal effect is achieved. For a range of views, see also Pattinson SD and Beyleveld D,
“Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal Effect” (2002) 118 LQR 623; Hunt M, “‘The Horizontal Effect’ of the Human Rights
Act” [1998] PL 423; Bamforth N, “The Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and Private Bodies”
[1999] CLJ 159; Phillipson G, “The Human Rights Act, Horizontal Effect on the Common Law: A Big Bang or a Whimper?”
(1999) 62 MLR 824; Leigh I and Lustgarten L, “Making Rights Real: The Courts, Remedies, and the Human Rights Act”
[1999] CLJ 509.
103 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 6(3) states that a public authority includes “(b) any person certain of whose functions are
functions of a public nature”.
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would have a substantial effect on private landlords and the private lettings market. This may become
more of an issue once the Localism Bill has been enacted. Furthermore, registered social landlords104
and private registered providers can be regarded as quasi-public bodies for the purposes of judicial
review proceedings and the Human Rights Act, s 6. Registered providers are in fact hybrid authorities,
exercising both public and private functions, and they may be considered to be a public body if their
housing management and allocation functions are deemed to be public functions. Elias LJ in R
(Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 587; [2010] 1 WLR 363 at
[66]-[72] established that the relevant criteria include the following: the substantial public subsidy
which enables the trust to achieve its objectives; whether the trust in its allocation of social housing
operates in very close harmony with the local government, assisting it to achieve the authority’s
statutory duties and objectives; and whether the provision of subsidised housing is a function which
can be described as governmental, since the provision of subsidy to meet the needs of the poorer
section of the community is a governmental function. The extension of the Human Rights Act to
different housing providers will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences.
The reality in English law is that the impact on private rights between individuals in land law has
been extremely limited.105 In Murphy v Wyatt [2011] EWCA Civ 408 at [80], Arden LJ left open the
question of the effect of Art 8 in a claim by a private landlord for possession of a piece of land where
the tenant lived, but realised that “the court hearing any further application for possession of the site
may have to do so”. Arden LJ was merely speculating because, at present, disputes between private
individuals do not come within the Human Rights Act, but if broad horizontal application is adopted in
the future, the whole body of land law will be open to review, and every settled principle of land law
may be open to scrutiny under the Human Rights Act.106 The county courts are dealing, on a daily
basis, with cases where “mandatory” possession is available against assured shorthold tenants and
fully assured tenants.107 It is, therefore, inevitable that the courts will have to grapple with the issue,
with the consequence that possession proceedings may be decided on the basis of fair outcomes in the
near future, where judges have to decide between a landlord entitled to possession and a tenant with
unusual and challenging personal circumstances.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The 21st century paradox in land law is a human rights one. English land law is an outsider to a
system of European property law, with the consequence that the threat to the autonomy of English
land law seems a remote possibility at present. However, human rights are progressively reshaping the
juridical basis of the law in relation to public authority landowners and potentially a wider category of
landowners. The Human Rights Act has made and will continue to make significant inroads, because
new dimensions of land entitlement will continue to alter the parameters of proprietary rights by
superimposing a layer of additional protection on the tenant or occupier of land. The real friction in
English land law, between issues concerning autonomy, human rights, equality and accommodation of
diversity, is epitomised by the central paradox of its demand for certainty, championing independence
and prioritising fundamental values.
The law had remained relatively static in relation to tensions in previous centuries and, while
there continues to be some resistance, it is equally clear that there is an admission that the regimes
governing English land law are due a change. From a functional perspective, the variety of forces has
led to a wider frame of discourse, with the Convention influencing “the shape and development of our
domestic law principles, whether one uses the metaphors of embedding, weaving into the fabric,
104 Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 (UK), ss 110-121, have replaced the registered social landlord in England with an
extended class of “registered providers” of social housing.
105 See Howell J, “The Human Rights Act 1998: Land, Private Citizens, and the Common Law” (2007) 123 LQR 618 at
629-635; Howell J, “The Human Rights Act 1998: The “Horizontal Effect” on Land Law” in Cooke E (ed), Modern Studies in
Property Law (Hart Publishing, 2001), Vol 1, p 149; Howell J, “Land and Human Rights” [1999] 63 Conv 287.
106 Howell (2007), n 105 at 635.
107 Luba, n 96 at 82, argues that the legislature should have retained the Rent Act position that most tenants could not be evicted
unless the court considers it reasonable to make a possession order.
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osmosis or alignment”.108 It is ironic that it was partly due to the lack of a unified judicial approach in
England which facilitated moves towards embracing a human rights agenda to land law, with the
consequence that Convention rights are being assimilated gradually into English law until they are
“woven into the fabric of domestic law”.109
Due to litigation being encouraged by the relative uncertainty of the impact of human rights on
land law, it is imperative that the Supreme Court analyses further, from a microcosmic perspective,
when and how it is practicable to take individual circumstances into account to justify the stance
advocated being a proportionate response to attaining a legitimate aim. It also needs to analyse, from
a macrocosmic perspective, to what extent the European Convention is recasting basic principles of
land law. As Rose stated:
the rhetoric of crystals focuses on the sense of predictability and security present in longterm dealings,
while the doctrine of mud focuses on the flexibility and willingness to make adjustments that longterm
dealings normally offer.110
Opening the floodgates of personal circumstances will lead to unforeseen consequences with the
decisions of county court judges becoming increasingly speculative. The culmination of the 20th
century with the passage of the Human Rights Act and the advent of the 21st century have witnessed
the reinforcement of basic principles of personal autonomy and the upholding of an individual’s own
human value. These raise the issue of whether we are discarding the desirability of rules and are losing
the sense of collective order in favour of being concerned with individuals and individualised notions
of fairness and justice.
108 Doran v Liverpool City Council [2009] EWCA Civ 146; [2009] 1 WLR 2365 at [52], referring to the opinion of Lord Walker
in Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [109].
109 Lord Walker in Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 AC 367 at [109], quoting from an
observation of Anthony Lester QC and David Pannick QC.
110 Rose, n 67 at 605.
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